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Abstract	
The	relationship	between	multinational	enterprise	and	governments	is	usually	presented	as	
a	zero-sum	power	game,	until	recently,	in	which	multinationals	have	become	increasingly	
powerful	at	the	expense	of	governments.	Yet	many	theories	of	the	development	of	global	
business	regard	governments	as	exogenous	variables,	focusing	instead	on	the	internal	
dynamics	of	MNEs.	Historical	studies	of	the	relationship	between	multinationals	and	
governments	have	shown	both	these	positions	to	be	flawed.	First,	governments	and	
multinationals	have	had	an	interdependent	relationship	–	ignoring	government	when	
considering	the	development	of	global	business	excludes	a	key	explanatory	factor	in	the	
development	of	both.	Secondly,	multinationals	and	governments	can	cooperate	as	well	as	
be	in	conflict	and	historians	have	shown	that	context	and	contingency	is	crucial	in	
understanding	the	nature	of	that	relationship	in	any	particular	case.	
	
	
	
In	January	2017	The	Economist	published	a	leading	article	entitled	‘In	Retreat:	The	
Multinational	Company	is	in	Trouble’	(The	Economist	2017).	It	noted:	‘The	retreat	of	global	
firms	will	give	politicians	a	feeling	of	greater	control	as	companies	promise	to	do	their	
bidding’.	Talk	of	the	end	of	an	era	for	the	global	firm	may	be	premature	but	it	does	capture	
the	commonly	perceived	tension	between	national	governments	and	multinational	
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enterprises	(MNEs).	However,	the	standard	account	is	of	the	rise	of	MNEs	and	the	
consequent	decline	of	the	nation-state	and	national	governments.	Certainly,	the	first	time	
The	Economist	is	believed	to	have	referred	to	MNEs	that	was	the	approach	they	took.	
‘Companies	Outgrow	Countries:	A	New	Kind	of	Economic	Animal	–	Mastodons	of	the	
Future?	–	Is	Displacing	Growing	Weight	Throughout	the	World	Economy’	was	the	title	of	a	
leading	article	which	went	on	to	highlight	‘the	inherent	flexibility	towards	national	
sovereignty	that	internationally	spread	private	companies	possess’	(The	Economist	1964).1	
Since	the	1960s	multinational	enterprise	was	increasingly	viewed	as	the	future	and	nation-
states	(and	their	governments)	as	‘just	about	through	as	an	economic	unit’	(Kindleberger	
1969:	207	and	more	recently	Ohmae	1990	and	Strange	1996).	In	the	most	extreme	form	of	
this	zero-sum	power	game	between	multinationals	and	governments	democracy	is	seen	as	
being	replaced	by	the	quiet	power	of	big	business	(for	example	Hertz	2001;	Korten	2001;	
and	George	2015).	
This	strand	of	argument	is	extensive,	reflecting	popular	concerns	about	the	power	of	
big	business	but	has	mainly	taken	the	form	of	empirical	studies,	usually	in	the	field	of	
political	economy,	and	dealing	with	the	period	since	the	Second	World	War.	However,	the	
starting	point	for	this	oeuvre	was	in	international	business	studies.	The	landmark	
publication	here	was	Raymond	Vernon’s	Sovereignty	at	Bay	(1971).	In	this	seminal	volume	
Vernon,	‘the	father	of	research	on	relations	between	nation	states	and	MNEs’	(Eden	2000:	
335),	set	out	that	there	would	inevitably	be	conflicts	between	MNEs	and	both	home	and	
host	countries.	However,	he	did	not	see	this	as	a	simple	zero-sum	game	in	the	way	that	
many	later	writers	have	done.	In	Sovereignty	at	Bay	and	in	subsequent	works	(1977	and	
1998),	Vernon	did	not	foresee	the	demise	of	the	nation-state.	Rather	he	saw	‘two	systems,	
																																																													
1	According	to	Luyckx	and	Janssens	(2016)	this	was	the	first	article	in	The	Economist	to	talk	about	MNEs	
directly.	
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…	each	legitimated	by	popular	consent,	each	potentially	useful	to	the	other,	yet	each	
containing	features	antagonistic	to	the	other’	(Vernon	1991:	191):	it	was	not	just	nation-
states	whose	sovereignty	was	at	bay	but	also	that	of	multinationals.	What	mattered,	in	
Vernon’s	view,	was	the	perception	of	a	loss	of	sovereignty	by	nation-states,	not	that	this	
was	necessarily	a	reality	(Boddewyn	2005:	37;	Kobrin	2001:	183).	Despite	such	early	
engagement	with	this	issue,	most	strands	of	the	international	business	literature,	in	contrast	
to	that	in	political	economy,	developed	to	say	little	directly	about	the	relationship	between	
MNEs	and	governments	or	their	regulations	(an	exception	is	John	Dunning	(see	Dunning	and	
Lundan	2008)).	Building	on	Stephen	Hymer’s	(1976)	work,	the	focus	has	been	on	internal	
explanations	for	the	existence	and	growth	of	multinational	enterprise	(Fitzgerald	2015:	2-4).	
Government,	its	policies	and	regulations	in	this	respect	are	exogenous	variables	to	which	
MNEs	respond	and	are	therefore	extraneous	to	many	IB	models	of	multinational	enterprise.	
There	are	issues	with	this	separation.	After	all,	at	the	heart	of	what	distinguishes	
‘international	business’	from	‘business’	more	generally	is	the	issue	of	territoriality	(Grosse	
2005:	3).	These	enterprises	are	and	have	been	multi-national	or	trans-national	and	it	is	this	
dimension	which	defines	them.	Given	the	centrality	of	governments	to	the	very	notion	of	
the	nation-state,	what	governments	are	like,	how	they	act,	how	they	change	over	time	and	
how	they	perceive	MNEs	affects	the	very	nature	of	MNEs.	Indeed,	the	merging	of	two	
nation-states	might	well	turn	some	MNEs	into	straightforward	enterprises.	Likewise,	it	is	
governments	that	establish	the	nature	of	property	rights	within	their	territorial	domains,	a	
key	aspect	of	political	risk	(see	the	chapter	by	Wubs	and	Kurosawa	in	this	volume).	
However,	in	recent	years	there	have	been	signs	of	a	greater	engagement	with	
international	business-government	relations	(IBGR)	from	management	scholars,	alongside	a	
recognition	of	their	importance	(see	Boddewyn	2016	for	an	overview).	Building	on	the	work	
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of	David	Baron	(1995),	non-market	strategy	is	now	recognized	as	a	key	element	of	corporate	
strategy	and	of	its	study	(Lawton	and	Rajwani	2015).	The	growth	in	studies	of	corporate	
social	responsibility	(CSR)	(for	example	Barton	et	al.	2016)	and	corporate	political	activities	
(CPA)	(for	example	Oliver	and	Holzinger	2008;	and	Henisz	and	Zelner	2010)	is	evidence	of	
this	development.	Much	of	this	literature	examines	the	relationship	between	MNEs	and	
emerging	economies	on	the	one	hand	in	terms	of	dealing	with	the	political	risks	faced	by	
MNEs	and,	on	the	other,	the	potential	for	exploitation	by	MNEs	(Lawton	et	al.	2012;	Lawton	
et	al.	2014).	However,	in	many	respects	a	focus	on	direct,	quantitative	effects	of	MNE	
activities	has	predominated,	such	as	the	impact	of	political	donations	on	policy	
development	(for	example	Bonica	2016).	This	may	provide	some	minimum	benchmark	of	
the	effectiveness	of	MNE	corporate	political	activities	but	seems	rather	narrowly	conceived.		
	 As	will	be	shown,	business	historians	have	explored	many	of	these	issues	already,	
providing	an	excellent	opportunity	for	a	mutually	beneficial	conversation.	In	this	respect,	
there	are	four	relevant	contributions	that	have	emerged	from	the	work	by	business	
historians.	First,	business	historians,	taking	a	more	embedded	view	of	the	position	of	
multinationals	in	society,	highlight	the	pivotal	role	of	governments,	not	just	in	implementing	
policies	which	impact	directly	on	MNEs,	but	also	in	creating	and	developing	the	general	
framework	in	which	MNEs	operate.	From	this,	and	secondly,	much	business	history	research	
has	highlighted	the	importance	of	context,	complexity	and	contingency	here.	Thirdly,	and	
related	to	this,	business	historians	have	been	able	to	provide	rich	and	detailed	accounts	of	
the	interaction	of	business	and	governments	in	the	form	of	CPA,	like	lobbying,	in	a	variety	of	
political	contexts.	They	are	able	to	explore	these	in	a	more	nuanced	and	sophisticated	way	
than	much	of	the	current	CPA	literature.	Finally,	and	most	importantly,	the	IB	literature	has	
been	heavily	influenced	by	its	roots	in	the	experience	of	post-Second	World	War	US	
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manufacturing	multinationals.	The	historical	dimension	provided	by	business	historians	has	
been	important	here	in	showing	how	widespread	multinationals	were	before	the	Second	
World	War.	More	relevant	here,	is	the	secondary	finding	that	in	the	context	of	rising	
nationalism,	interactions	between	MNEs	and	national	governments	were	at	least	as	visible	
before	as	after	the	Second	World	War.	Likewise,	the	influence	of	empire	and	the	
consequences	of	empire	have	been	highlighted,	though	again	this	influence	was	not	
insuperable.	
The	chapter	begins	by	elaborating	on	the	contribution	of	an	historical	perspective	to	
the	making	of	global	business	to	our	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	
multinationals	and	governments.	Two	areas	of	study	are	then	explored	in	more	depth	to	
highlight	the	two-way	and	complex	nature	of	the	relationship.	One	examines	the	
relationship	between	MNEs	and	government	in	the	context	of	European	integration,	that	is	
as	a	move	away	from	national	levels	of	governance,	the	other	considers	the	highly	topical	
and	controversial	subject	of	tax	avoidance	and	tax	evasion.	Finally,	there	is	space	for	some	
brief	conclusions.		
	
Business	History	literature	
The	early	IB	literature	focused	on	US	manufacturing	multinationals	and	it	was	from	studying	
their	experiences	that	theories	of	multinational	enterprise	emerged.	Business	historians	
have	taken	a	broader	perspective.	While	they	have	contributed	to	our	understanding	of	
American	multinationals	at	this	time	(for	example	Wilkins	1974;	and	Rollings	2011),	this	has	
been	only	one	of	their	fields	of	interest.	One	of	the	most	obvious	contributions	by	business	
historians	was	to	show	the	existence	of	MNEs	in	other	sectors	of	the	economy,	notably	the	
service	sector.	This	is	relevant	to	IBGR	because	the	service	sector	is	often	more	regulated	
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than	manufacturing.	Geoffrey	Jones’s	(1990,	1993)	work	on	banks	as	multinationals	led	the	
way	here.	Building	on	this,	others	have	examined	a	range	of	service	sectors.	Thus	Wilkins	
(2009)	has	shown	the	impact	of	regulation	on	the	development	of	multinationals	in	the	
insurance	industry.	Similarly,	Calvo	(2008)	and	Clifton	et	al.	(2011)	have	shown	how	
differences	in	regulation	impacted	upon	the	internationalization	of	telecommunications	
companies	both	before	and	after	the	Second	World	War.	A	different	form	of	interaction	
with	government	has	been	found	in	the	construction	industry	where	government	was	often	
involved	in	purchasing	(Linder	1994;	Donzé	2015).	In	the	case	of	the	international	hotel	
industry,	government	influence	was	felt	through	the	encouragement	of	US	governments	to	
stimulate	international	travel	and	indirectly	by	international	governance	mechanisms,	in	this	
example	the	Convention	in	International	Civil	Aviation	(Quek	2012).	
	 Similarly,	while	the	IB	literature	tended	to	concentrate	on	the	internal	dynamics	of	
MNEs,	business	historians	have	readily	acknowledged	the	importance	of	governments	in	
determining	the	development	of	MNEs.	Thus	Colli	(2016:	9)	has	recently	written:	‘Despite	a	
very	diffused	perception	of	globalization	as	being	incompatible	with	the	role	of	national	
governments,	the	latter	played	and	continue	to	play	a	pivotal	role	in	the	process	of	the	
internationalization	of	enterprises	and	entrepreneurs’.	Such	sentiments	are	readily	found	in	
other	core	business	history	texts	(Jones	2005:	201;	Jones	2008:	154).	However,	it	is	perhaps	
most	thoroughly	illustrated	in	Fitzgerald’s	recent	contribution,	The	Rise	of	the	Global	
Company	(2015).	Here,	Fitzgerald	(2015,	18)	addresses	many	of	the	aspects	of	the	
relationship	between	MNEs	and	governments	raised	in	the	business	history	literature:	
‘Through	law,	taxation,	subsidies,	regulation,	and	policies,	the	state	has	been	a	strong	
influence	on	multinational	business	strategy,	corporate	organization,	and	employment’.	
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That	MNEs	are	embedded	in	a	political	and	regulatory	context	has	been	viewed	by	business	
historians	as	crucial	to	understanding	and	explaining	their	development.	
	 Much	of	the	IB	and	political	economy	literature	tends	to	focus	on	the	nature	of	the	
relationship	between	MNEs	and	national	governments	in	rather	simple	dichotomies	–	
conflict	or	cooperation,	or,	who	has	more	power?	In	contrast,	business	historians	have	
highlighted	that	these	relationships	are	more	fluid	and	contingent,	and,	as	they	change,	so	
this	required	MNEs	to	adapt	as	best	they	could	to	those	changes,	even	if	this	meant	
accommodation	with	authoritarian	political	regimes	(Kobrak	and	Hansen	2004;	and	Wubs	
2008).	Donzé	and	Kurosawa	(2013)	suggest	from	the	example	of	Nestlé	in	Japan	that	
European	multinationals	tended	to	be	more	pragmatic	and	organizationally	flexible	than	
their	American	counterparts	in	dealing	with	difficult	political	environments.	But	this	was	not	
simply	as	part	of	some	recalibration	of	the	balance	of	power	between	the	MNE	and	the	
home	and/or	host	government:	‘Business	success	is	not	only	about	power,	it	is	also	about	
navigating	in	politicized	environments,	in	which	economic	considerations	do	not	always	
come	first’	(Sandvik	and	Storli	2013:	130-31).	Equally,	this	is	not	a	simple	two-	or	three-actor	
model	of	MNE,	host	government	and	(sometimes)	home	government	as	the	IB	literature	
often	tends	to	assume.	Just	as	the	MNE	is	not	a	monolith	so	the	same	is	the	case	for	
governments,	as	the	political	science	literature	has	long	understood	(see	for	example	
Rhodes	1997).	The	cases	presented	by	business	historians	of	IBGR	highlight,	therefore,	the	
complexity	and	contingency	involved	in	assessing	and	managing	political	risk	and	that	this	is	
not	simply	a	case	of	power	relationships.			
	 Managing	political	risk	has	also	been	a	theme	of	another	branch	of	the	business	
historiography	of	IBGR,	that	is	studies	relating	to	MNEs	and	developing	host	economies.	
Business	historians	have,	in	particular,	addressed	the	colonial	and	post-colonial	dimension.	
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Verma	and	Abdelrehim	(2017)	present	a	similar	argument	about	the	importance	of	context	
and	contingency	to	those	considered	above,	but	in	a	post-colonial	context:	the	relationships	
between	Burmah	Shell,	the	Burmah	Oil	Company	and	the	Indian	government	fluctuated	
between	cooperation	and	conflict	in	what	was	a	complex	relationship	in	which	a	legacy	of	
imperial	relationships	continued	to	have	influence.	Sometimes	this	imperial	legacy	proved	
too	much:	Merrett	(2007)	has	shown	how	the	withdrawal	of	Australian	MNEs	from	post-
colonial	Fiji	and	Papua	New	Guinea	occurred,	despite	the	host	governments’	desire	for	them	
to	stay,	because	the	companies	were	unable	to	adjust	to	this	new	context.	In	other	cases,	
empire	and	the	imperial	legacy	does	not	seem	to	have	been	that	influential	in	determining	
market	access	(Decker	2011;	Lubinski	2015).	
	 The	influence	of	empire	on	IBGR	stretches	back	much	further	in	time	too.	In	the	age	
of	high	imperialism	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	there	were	many	examples	of	
European	governments	turning	informal	empire	into	formal	empire	to	protect	the	rights	and	
assets	of	multinationals.	MNEs	exploited	this	to	embark	on	their	own	scramble	for	Africa	
(Jones	2000:	75-80).	Moreover,	the	British	government	revisited	an	old	model	of	business	by	
issuing	charters	to	certain	companies	to	create	state-sanctioned	monopolies	for	certain	
parts	of	Africa.	Like	the	East	India	Company	(Carlos	and	Nicholas	1988;	Bowen	2005)	and	
other	chartered	companies	before	them	there	was	a	direct	relationship	between	home	
governments	and	the	operation	of	these	state	monopolies.	But	this	influence	could	also	be	
less	direct	too:	by	spreading	legal	systems	from	the	metropole	to	the	rest	of	empire,	
investor	risks	were	reduced	by	replicating	property	and	other	rights	and	by	encouraging	
companies	to	operate	outside	their	home	country.	Thus,	Mira	Wilkins	(1998:	435)	posed	the	
question	as	to	whether	there	was	a	link,	perhaps	related	to	reduced	information	
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asymmetries	and	colonial	administration,	between	free-standing	companies	and	empire	
because	these	companies	were	at	their	zenith	in	the	age	of	high	imperialism.		
This	strand	of	imperial	and	colonial	business	history	is	part	of	a	third	important	
contribution	to	our	understanding	of	the	development	of	IBGR	by	moving	research	beyond	
the	era	of	the	‘classic’	US	manufacturing	multinational	of	the	post-Second	World	War	era.	
From	an	early	date,	business	historians	have	shown	that	the	history	of	multinationals	is	a	
long	one	(Wilkins	1970	and	1974).	Such	work	has	included	many	insights	relating	to	IBGR	
and	from	which	some	important	findings	have	emerged.	First,	it	has	been	conventional	to	
view	the	First	World	War	as	marking	a	watershed	in	this	IBGR	(Jones	2005,	203).	Prior	to	
that	date,	unless	there	were	strategic	issues,	governments	did	not	seem	that	concerned	by	
foreign	ownership	issues	and	MNEs	had	a	relatively	free	hand.	With	the	war	restrictions,	
expropriation	of	assets	without	compensation	by	host	governments	became	increasingly	
common.	For	example,	Coats	lost	their	mill	in	Russia	following	the	Bolshevik	revolution	(Kim,	
1995).	Thereafter,	throughout	the	interwar	period	governments	took	far	more	interest	in	
foreign	multinationals	with	various	restrictions	and	prohibitions	imposed,	notably	in	the	US	
(Wilkins	2004).	This	era	is	frequently	associated	with	international	cartelization	(Fear	2008;	
Kindleberger	1989:	233),	and	it	became	common	to	refer	to	the	rise	of	MNEs	after	1945	as,	
in	part,	the	consequence	of	tighter	regulation	of	cartels	which	made	market	access	easier	
(Fitzgerald	2015:	258-331).		
Yet,	it	is	clear	we	should	not	take	this	too	far	(Dehne	2013).	Indeed	Tworek	(2015)	
refers	to	the	period	from	about	1850	to	the	Second	World	War	as	‘the	age	of	
multinationals’.	And	if	one	looks	beyond	Europe	it	has	been	suggested	that	‘the	interwar	
years	were	not	a	period	of	deglobalization,	but	a	period	in	which	the	relations	between	
states	and	firms	and	between	the	West	and	the	‘rest’	were	reordered	and	renegotiated’	
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(Dejung	and	Petersson	2013:	16).	The	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	has	received	
considerable	attention	from	business	historians	interested	in	IBGR:	‘What	the	
period…between	1914	and	1929,	and	even	more	so	from	1929	to	1948…	especially	
illustrated	was	the	influence	of	home	and	host	country	governments	on	the	activities	of	
multinationals,	and	it	revealed	the	power	that	nation	states,	even	those	in	the	developing	
economies	of	Latin	America	could	impose	on	foreign-owned	business….	[It	also	showed]	
‘how	assertions	of	national	sovereignty	could	strongly	clash	with	the	multinational’s	
assertion	of	private	property	rights	and	preference	for	open	cross-border	trade’	(Fitzgerald	
2015:	257).	An	example	of	how	these	policies	developed	even	in	countries	traditionally	with	
open	trade	policies	and	limited	regulatory	powers	is	provided	by	Scott	and	Rooth	(1999).	
MNEs	remained	key	actors	at	that	time	but	they	had	to	adjust	their	strategies	in	the	light	of	
the	increased	scrutiny	that	they	faced.	Frank	(2009)	has	shown	how	Standard	Oil	tried	to	be	
flexible	in	its	presentation	of	its	Austrian	subsidiary	depending	on	the	audience	it	was	
addressing.	The	same	company	(and	its	competitors)	had	mixed	success	with	its	legitimizing	
strategies	in	South	America	(Bucheli	2010;	Bucheli	and	Sommer	2014).		Bucheli	(2008)	has	
also	shown	how	in	the	case	of	the	United	Fruit	Company	in	Central	America	that	similar	
political	interests	(such	as	anti-unionism)	was	not	sufficient	to	guarantee	cooperation	from	a	
host	government.	
	 These	cases	illustrate	not	only	the	adjustment	of	market	strategies	by	MNEs	but	also	
their	non-market	strategies.	Corporate	political	activities,	in	the	form	of	lobbying	and	
relationship	building	with	national	governments	were	a	core	element	of	these	MNEs’	
strategies,	even	if	they	were	not	always	successful.	These	political	activities	took	many	
forms	(Nye	1974)	–	from	outright	illegal	activities	like	bribery	and	corruption	(Dosal	1993;	
Bucheli	&	Minefee	in	this	volume)	to	behind-the-scenes	lobbying	(Culpepper	2011)	and	on	
11	
	
to	open	involvement	in	standard-setting	(Moguen-Toursel	2002;	Ramírez	Pérez	2007)	and	
institution	building	(Ringe	and	Rollings	2000).	Many	of	these	activities	occurred	through	the	
auspices	of	business	interest	associations	but	individual	multinationals	also	acted	directly.	In	
addition,	multinational	firms	were	also	at	the	heart	of	more	general	business	lobbying	
(Rollings	2013;	Phillips-Fein	and	Zelizer	2012;	John	and	Phillips-Fein	2017;	Waterhouse	
2014).	From	this	a	more	nuanced	picture	of	political	influence	has	emerged	which	has	
explored	less	direct	and	softer	forms	of	influence	but	which,	once	more,	illustrates	the	
complexity	and	contingency	of	the	relationship	between	MNEs	and	governments.	
	 The	final,	if	still	emergent,	contribution	by	business	historians	relates	to	the	
appropriate	level	of	governance	of	MNEs.	From	the	outset	Raymond	Vernon	argued	that	
conflict	between	MNEs	and	national	governments	was	inevitable	because	of	the	ability	of	
MNEs	to	exploit	differences	in	national	policies.	Vernon	became	exercised	over	issues	like	
transfer	pricing	and	taxation	(Eden	2000):	governance	and	regulation	needed	to	become	
more	uniform,	be	it	through	bilateral	treaties,	or	institutions	of	regional	or	global	regulation.	
As	many	have	argued,	the	danger	without	such	action	is	a	continued	‘race	to	the	bottom’	in	
the	desire	to	attract	investment.	The	next	two	sections	explore	these	issues	in	more	depth	
by	examining	two	particular	areas	of	study.	The	first,	business	and	European	integration,	is	
the	more	established	but	still	developing,	while	the	second,	multinationals	and	taxation	
remains	nascent,	despite	Vernon’s	long-standing	concerns.		
	
European	Integration	
European	integration	offers	an	interesting	angle	on	IBGR	because	of	its	supranational	
dimension.	What	has	been	the	effect	of	the	existence	of	the	European	Union	on	the	
development	of	global	business,	as	a	market,	as	a	regulator	and	as	a	new	forum	for	MNE	
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influence.	Surprisingly	few	works	in	business	history	deal	directly	with	the	first	issue.	The	
most	obvious	exception	to	this	is	Jones	and	Miskell	(2005)	which	examines	Unilever’s	
restructuring	strategy	in	light	of	European	integration.	Ramírez	Pérez	(2007)	has	also	
published	work	on	the	automobile	industry.	
	 In	terms	of	regulation,	there	is	one	area	where	MNEs	have	been	directly	and	
powerfully	affected	by	EEC/EU	institutions:	competition	policy.	One	needs	only	to	think	of	
the	recent	cases	against	Microsoft	and	Google	over	abuse	of	dominant	position	and	the	
hefty	fines	imposed	on	numerous	MNEs	for	cartel	misbehavior	to	be	aware	of	the	EU’s	
profound	influence	here	(Damro	and	Guay	2016;	and	Cini	and	McGowan	2008).	Historians	
have	already	developed	an	extensive	historiography	of	the	development	of	EEC	competition	
policy	and	now	business	historians	are	also	beginning	to	contribute	to	this	field.2	A	
forthcoming	special	issue	of	Business	History	(edited	by	Rollings	and	Warlouzet)	presents	
cases	of	business	responses	to	various	aspects	of	EEC	competition	policy	in	the	computer	
industry,	aluminum	industry,	the	paper	and	pulp	industry,	shipbuilding,	car	distribution	and	
boiler	makers.		
	 The	other	side	of	the	coin	is	the	impact	of	MNEs	on	European	integration.	European	
integration	is	traditionally	seen	as	something	to	the	advantage	of	MNEs	as	they	can	exploit	
economies	of	scale	associated	with	the	larger	market:	the	European	Roundtable	of	
Industrialists,	for	example,	have	been	credited	by	some	with	relaunching	European	
integration	in	the	early	1980s	(Green	Cowles	1995).	Politically	there	have	also	been	
possibilities	for	standardization	and	harmonization	of	regulatory	regimes.	On	the	other	
hand,	the	existence	of	supranational	political	institutions	is	likely	to	reduce	the	bargaining	
power	of	MNEs.		
																																																													
2	For	an	overview	see	the	introduction	to	the	forthcoming	Business	History	special	issue.	
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MNEs	were	closely	linked	with	the	process	of	integration.	This	was	particularly	the	
case	of	US	multinationals	which	followed	the	lead	of	Marshall	Aid	to	Western	Europe	by	
embarking	on	a	massive	expansion	of	foreign	direct	investment	(Wilkins	1974).	Such	was	the	
influx	of	US	MNEs	by	the	1970s	that	not	only	was	it	common	to	refer	to	the	notion	of	the	
Americanization	of	Europe	(McCreary	1964),	but	also	that	‘It	has	become	a	cliché	that	
American	companies	have	integrated	the	European	economies’	(Behrman	1972:	50;	Wilkins	
1996;	Tolliday	2003).	However,	historians	of	European	integration	rejected	this	argument,	
proposing	that	European	integration	was	a	process	internal	to	Europe.	Initially,	this	
historiography	was	dominated	by	diplomatic	historians	but	even	when	economic	historians	
analyzed	European	integration	such	arguments	still	held	no	sway	(Milward	1992	and	2006;	
Guirao	et	al.	2012).	This	was	because	the	focus	of	European	integration	historians	was	on	
the	emergence	and	development	of	the	political	institutions	of	the	European	Economic	
Community	and	this	placed	national	governments	and	the	nation-state	at	the	heart	of	
European	integration	(for	overviews	see	Dinan	2014:	345-75;	Loth	2008;	and	Kaiser	and	
Varsori	2010).	
Recently,	historians	of	European	integration	have	begun	to	reassess	this	position	and	
to	re-define	the	meaning	of	European	integration	and,	with	that,	the	key	actors	involved.	
The	outcome	has	been	an	appreciation	of	a	much	broader	notion	of	European	integration.	
In	the	early	years	of	European	integration	there	were	multiple	competing	and	overlapping	
notions	of	European	integration,	not	just	the	European	Economic	Community	(EEC).	Limiting	
attention	to	the	EEC	is	overly	deterministic	(Rollings	and	Kipping	2008).	Linked	to	this	has	
been	a	move	to	bring	society	back	in	(Kaiser	and	Starie	2005;	Kaiser	et	al.	2009;	Kaiser	and	
Meyer	2013).	One	element	here	is	the	role	of	business	actors	and	business	lobbying	in	
influencing	the	course	of	European	integration.	An	increasingly	extensive	historiography	has	
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appeared	looking	at	this	from	a	national	level	and	from	a	European	level.	Some	of	this	
relates	to	business	representative	bodies	and	trade	associations	(Morival	2014	and	2015;	
Rollings	2007;	Geven	2014;	Badel	and	Michel	2011)	where	MNE	influence	on	EEC	political	
institutions	can	be	seen	but	is	indirect,	but	also	to	the	direct	actions	of	multinational	
enterprises	(Moguen-Toursel	2002	and	2007;	Ramírez	Pérez	2007,	2008,	2009a,	2009b).	This	
was	particularly	the	case	in	areas	of	what	might	be	termed	low	politics.	
	 A	separate,	but	related,	development	in	the	historiography	of	European	integration	
has	flowed	from	Misa	and	Schot’s	2005	article	on	‘the	hidden	integration’	of	Europe.	This	
was	the	starting	point	for	a	series	of	publications	exploring	the	spread	of	technological	
innovations	across	Europe	and	the	related	network	linkages.	These	provided	the	
infrastructure	for	drawing	Europe	together,	not	necessarily	of	the	basis	of	the	six	countries	
that	went	on	to	create	the	EEC	but,	nevertheless,	providing	a	framework	and	linkages	from	
which	political	integration	might	emerge	(Kaiser	and	Schot	2014;	Kohlrausch	and	Trischler	
2014).	Often	these	studies	show	how	networks	of	experts,	including	businessmen,	built	links	
through	the	construction	of	transnational	infrastructure	projects	(Van	der	Vleuten	and	
Kaijser	2006;	Lagendijk	2008;	Badenoch	and	Fickers	2010;	Högselius	et	al.	2015).	Coming	full	
circle	in	the	historiography,	Paju	and	Haigh	(2016)	draw	inspiration	from	this	approach	to	
elaborate	IBM’s	approach	to	Western	Europe	after	the	Second	World	War	and	show	how	
IBM	embraced	European	integration	‘by	engineering	its	own	networks	of	interdependence	
among	European	nations’	(268).	We	are	beginning	to	see	more	clearly	the	ways	in	which	
MNEs	contributed	towards	European	integration	both	directly	and	indirectly	and	were	
affected	by	it	too.	
	
Multinationals	and	taxation	
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The	second	area	of	focus,	multinationals	and	taxation,	is	clearly	a	current	issue	of	popular	
concern	with	the	publicity	given	to	the	low	levels	of	corporate	taxation	paid	by	many	
multinationals.	Historical	analysis	of	the	development	of	this	trend	is	nascent	but	has	moved	
forward	significantly	in	the	last	couple	of	years.	This	offers	two	important	ways	to	improve	
our	understanding	of	the	growth	of	multinationals.	First,	there	are	the	organisational	
implications	for	multinationals.		According	to	the	New	York	Times,	Enron	at	the	time	of	its	
collapse	had	881	subsidiaries	in	tax	havens,	including	692	in	the	Cayman	Islands	and	119	in	
the	Turks	and	Caicos	Islands	(quoted	in	Palan	2003:	193	fn7).		Related	to	this,	a	raft	of	
literature	exists	on	the	phenomenon	of	transfer	pricing,	whereby	multinationals	move	
goods	and	services	between	subsidiaries	to	maximise	tax	efficiency	(avoid	taxation)	(for	an	
overview	see	Eden	1998),	but	most	is	from	a	narrowly	economic	or	tax	perspective.	Little	
work,	to	date,	has	considered	the	organisational	implications	of	the	growing	complexity	of	
these	structures,	nor	the	consequences	in	terms	of	the	internal	organisational	dynamics	of	
its	operations,	with	the	focus	remaining	on	the	production	and	delivery	of	goods	and	
services.	Business	historians	need	to	explore	the	historical	development	of	these	changing	
organisational	forms.		
Secondly,	and	developing	this	last	point,	the	long-term	development	of	this	
phenomenon	requires	exploration.	Most	work	in	this	field	assumes	that	this	is	a	post-1945	
phenomenon	linked	to	the	spread	of	US	multinationals	and	the	emergence	of	the	Eurodollar	
markets.	A	literature	is	beginning	to	question	this	assumption	but	largely	from	the	
perspective	of	the	establishment	of	tax	havens	(Palan	et	al.	2010;	Zucman	2015;	Sagar	et	al.	
2013).	Ogle	(2017)	and	Palan	(2003)	have	adopted	a	more	historical	approach.	They	both	
emphasise	a)	the	importance	of	a	longer-term	approach	to	the	development	of	tax	havens,	
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often	with	their	roots	in	empire	and	b)	that	the	tax	havens	often	were	of	value	to	the	very	
national	governments	who,	as	a	result,	lost	tax	revenue.		
	 The	period	before	the	Second	World	War	is	also	beginning	to	be	studied	on	its	own	
merits	by	a	new	generation	of	historians.	Farquet	(2013;	2016)	has	explored	the	interwar	
development	of	Switzerland	as	a	tax	haven.	Similarly,	Izawa	in	his	Ph.	D	and	various	
conference	presentations	has	analysed	the	emergence	of	double	taxation	agreements	after	
the	First	World	War.	Significantly,	he	also	examines	the	role	of	multinational	business	in	this	
process,	including	their	development	of	subsidiaries	to	avoid	double	taxation	(Izawa	2015)	
and	their	political	activities	(Izawa	2017).	Here	then	is	a	nascent	emergent	field	of	study	for	
business	historians.3		
Like	the	study	of	cartels,	business	records	for	the	period	before	the	Second	World	
War	can	reveal	the	extent	to	which	MNEs	engaged	with	issues	about	taxation.	For	the	
period	after	1945	business	records	may	be	less	forthcoming	given	the	lack	of	transparency	
around	such	issues,	the	sensitivity	of	companies	to	public	disclosure	of	such	activities,	and	
the	complexity	of	the	structures	created.	However,	alternative	sources	do	exist	and	are	yet	
to	be	exploited	systematically.	First,	there	are	the	enormous	collection	of	records	of	tobacco	
companies	made	available	via	the	Truth	Tobacco	Industry	Documents	(previously	known	as	
the	Legacy	Tobacco	Documents	Library)	
(https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/).	The	15	million	documents	
available	online	include	some	those	on	tax	avoidance	and	on	the	use	of	tax	havens	by	
tobacco	companies.	A	second	source	is	the	collections	of	records	released	by	the	
International	Consortium	of	Investigative	Journalists	as	the	Panama	Papers,	the	Paradise	
Papers	and	similar	records,	some	of	which	date	back	to	the	1970s	
																																																													
3	There	will	be	a	session	on	the	topic	at	the	2018	World	Economic	History	Congress	in	Boston.	
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(https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/).	Finally,	government	records	do	sometimes	deal	with	
multinationals’	tax	affairs	as	well	as	tax	havens,	in	addition	to	the	studies	carried	out	by	
international	bodies	like	the	OECD.	For	example,	in	the	1970s	the	UK	government	carried	
out	examinations	of	transfer	pricing,	concluding	that	fears	about	the	practice	were	a	good	
deal	exaggerated	and	that	there	was	no	systematic	and	widespread	abuse	by	
multinationals.	Nevertheless,	what	stood	out	was	the	diversity	of	practice:	multinational	
structures	provided	scope	for	tax	avoidance	and	in	1976	the	Inland	Revenue	was	examining	
180	companies	on	this	issue	(TNA	1976).	A	year	earlier	a	Customs	and	Excise	‘Group	of	
Four’,	established	to	examine	these	issues,	noted	that	the	cases	which	had	been	most	
financially	productive	for	the	UK	included	Fison	(fertilisers),	Beecham	(pharmaceuticals)	and	
the	US	multinational	Halliburton	in	addition	to	the	more	famous	case	of	Hoffmann	La	Roche	
(TNA	1975).	Studying	this	topic	may	not	be	straightforward	but	is	beginning	to	happen	and	
seems	timely	given	the	significance	attached	to	the	topic.	
	
Conclusions		
If	one	accepts	that	markets	and	companies	are	embedded	in	a	wider	economic,	social	and	
political	context	then	it	is	inevitable	that	governments	will	be	a	fundamental	influence	on	
business	through	their	regulations,	their	laws,	their	taxes	and	their	policies.	As	noted	at	the	
outset,	territoriality	distinguishes	international	business	and	MNEs	from	other	forms	of	
business.	Without	nation-states	and	national	governments	there	would	not	be	MNEs.	
European	integration	amends	this	picture	but	not	in	any	fundamental	way.	In	addition,	
while	conflict	between	MNEs	and	governments	may	be	widespread,	there	can	also	be	
cooperation.	More	importantly,	this	is	only	one	element	of	a	more	complex	relationship	
where	context	and	contingency	matter.	Equally,	this	is	a	two-way	relationship	where	
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multinationals	also	influence	national	governments	via	a	range	of	corporate	political	
activities.	Yet,	once	more,	this	has	not	been	a	straightforward	process	of	political	influence.	
Historical	study	of	the	making	of	global	business	again	shows	the	importance	of	contingency	
and	context.	As	a	result,	it	is	only	with	further	cases	that	we	will	begin	to	be	able	to	discern	
patterns	among	those	contingencies	in	any	systematic	way.	In	other	words,	there	is	plenty	
of	need	(and	scope)	for	more	of	the	same	–	for	more	case	studies	exploring	MNE	–	home-	
and	MNE	–	host-country	government	relations	to	provide	a	fuller	and	more	detailed	
understanding	of	the	complexities	of	these	relationships.	
	 Raymond	Vernon’s	solution	to	the	potential	conflicts	between	MNEs	and	national	
governments	was	to	move	towards	forms	of	transnational	governance.	The	history	of	
European	integration	and	studies	around	this	issue	of	multinationals	and	taxation	have	
shown	that	while	this	may	offer	some	solutions	these	are,	again,	not	straightforward.	As	
illustrated	in	the	case	of	tax	havens,	this	is	because	it	is	false	to	depict	the	relationship	
between	international	business	and	governments	as	a	zero-sum	power	game	of	political	
competitors.	Rather,	there	is	a	symbiotic	interdependent	relationship	but	one	which	is	fluid	
and	dependent	on	context	and	circumstances.		
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